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Economic Reform and Openness in China: 
China’s Development Policies in the Last 30 Years 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article adopts the point of view that China’s development policies can only be 
appreciated if they are considered by applying perspectives from institutional 
economics. This requires attention to be given to the historical, political and cultural 
context in which its economic development has occurred. Therefore, this article gives 
attention to the political events leading up to China’s decision in 1978 to begin its 
economic reforms and the way in which Deng Xiaoping crafted its new development 
path. It also discusses the subsequent extension of Deng’s development policies by 
more recent leaders of the Chinese Communist Party. Indicators of China’s economic 
progress (including its increasing economic openness) since 1978 are given, and its 
emerging economic issues and concerns are highlighted. The concept of ‘market 
socialism with Chinese characteristics” is analysed and consideration is given to the 
economic challenges now facing China as a result of the global economic recession 
and the way it is responding to these challenges. In conclusion, the article touches on 
China’s economic and political future and its growing international status. 
 
JEL Codes: P00; P20; P26; P27; P30; O10; O20. 
 
Keywords: China, developmental states, economic development, economic reforms, 
institutional economics, market socialism. 
 
Economic Reform and Openness in China: 
China’s Development Policies in the Last 30 Years 
 
1 Introduction 
Since 1978, China has experienced extraordinary institutional change which has 
proven to be effective in promoting its economic growth and is advancing its 
international status. It has achieved institutional change in a steady systematic and 
staged manner. This has altered its economic system substantially. At the same time, 
the structure of its political system has hardly altered. It still remains a one-party state 
which relies heavily on the guidance of the leadership of the Communist Party for its 
direction. Institutional economists contend that the development of nations can only 
be well understood by considering the manner in which their institutions change and 
evolve or fail to do so. This requires simultaneous account to be taken of their 
political, social and economic settings. The importance of doing this is apparent in 
China’s case where the government has played a very active role in the reform of 
China’s institutions since 1978. Therefore, I give considerable attention in this article 
to political events that have influenced the development of China in the last 30 years.  
Most institutional economist believe that traditional neoclassical economics is unable 
to provide an adequate explanation of the forces that promote or retard economic 
development (see, for example, North, 2003, pp. 2-3) because it fails to take into 
account factors that shape institutions, particularly political institutions. In this context, 
North (2003, p.3) states, “The economic institutions we have that shape directly our 
world derive from political institutions. Economists do not like to think that they are 
dependent on political science but they are. As well as recognizing the formal rules 
like constitutions, laws, rules and regulations, we are interested in who makes the 
rules and for whom”. This view is adopted in this article but it is also pertinent to note 
that political institutions are not the sole influence on economic institutions. For 
example, the cultural background of a society shapes norms which in turn have 
consequences for economic and political institutions. Institutional change involves 
complex social interactions (mutual causation) and path-dependence. For example, in 
the case of China, Confucianism may be linked with the type of political systems it 
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has sustained. Confucian culture supports respect for authority and values social 
stability maintained by an acceptable authority (compare Qian and Wu, 2008, p.62).  
Few, if anyone, could have imagined in 1978 how much economic and social progress 
China would make in the next 30 years as a result of deciding to embark on its 
economic reforms and to introduce open-door policies. The purpose of China’s reform 
was said to be develop ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ (Deng Xiaoping, 
1984). As a result of these reforms, China’s economy has been transformed. It has 
changed from an economy in which market forces played virtually no role in 
organizing economic activity to one in which these forces play a major role. China has 
also gone from a position where it had virtually no foreign investment and a low-level 
of international trade and exchange to a position where it is a major global recipient of 
foreign investment and its trade and foreign exchange reserves are very high in 
comparison to its level of national production. A variety of indicators demonstrate that 
economic welfare in China has shown an upsurge in the last 30 years. 
However, in 1977, there was no sign that China was about to change its economic 
policies and the extent of its cooperation with the outside world. Examination of the 
documents of the Eleventh National Congress of the CCP (The Communist Party of 
China) held in 1997 reveals a commitment to past practices and policies (The 
Communist Party of China, 1977). Therefore, it seemed that without a change in 
political leadership, China would be stuck in its old economic groove, with well-worn 
philosophies and a negative outlook on the world. 
Credit for the change in direction goes primarily to Deng Xiaoping and subsequent 
Chinese leaders who have followed in his footsteps and have continued to develop, 
modify and apply his approach. In retrospect, Deng Xiaoping was a wise and 
courageous leader. He was courageous in that several CCP members at the time 
would have viewed his approach as radical. He was wise in the sense that he could 
foresee the advantages to China of the reforms and opening up but was also aware that 
the reforms would have to be phased in at a gradual pace and systematically. 
But as is to be expected, he could not foresee and provide solutions to all development 
issues that would eventually arise for China, such as growing income inequality, 
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environmental problems and the global economic crisis that is currently plaguing 
China.  
It is not clear that Deng Xiaoping’s major objectives were very different to those of 
the CCP prior to his reforms. These were firstly to maintain the position of the CCP in 
China and promote economic growth. The main change was in the methods believed 
to be necessary to achieve China’s economic growth and thereby sustain the status of 
the CCP. New methods required in turn significant institutional change. It could be 
argued that China has had an obsession with achieving material economic growth 
since the CCP came to power in 1949 but that with the passage of time, central 
economic direction of its economy became less and less effective in achieving this 
objective, and in meeting the needs of its population (Tisdell, 1993, Chs. 1-2) and this 
posed a growing threat to the dominance of the CCP. By the time Chairman Mao 
Zedong died, this had become painfully clear. While some scholars consider that 
China only became a developmental state after commencing its economic reforms, 
(Bolesta, 2007; Woo-Cumings 1999), an alternative view is that it was this from 1949 
onwards but that now it is pursuing a different path to achieve its objectives. This will 
be discussed later. 
This article first of all considers the period leading up to the decision in 1978 to begin 
the reforms and then outlines this decision and the consolidation and extension of the 
economic and social reforms. After this, the nature of the ongoing reforms under Jiang 
Zemin and Hu Jintao are outlined and this is followed by indicators of China’s 
economic progress since 1978 as well as discussion of changes in its economic 
openness. Consideration is also given to the meaning of the concept of ‘socialism with 
Chinese characteristics’ which has become a core part of the vision of the CCP. 
Subsequently, the reform process is viewed in retrospect, the challenges faced by 
China in coping with the current global recession are given particular attention and 
some views are provided on China’s future prospects. The discussion is of necessity 
selective and restricted because so much has changed in China in the last 30 years. 
Given the nature of China’s system of government, unavoidably much of the 
discussion hinges on political changes in leadership of the CCP. Only limited 
coverage can be given to political factors occurring behind-the-scenes that have 
influenced the development policies adopted by China. The main coverage of political 
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factors in this article is based on visible alterations in politics and official Chinese 
reports of these. Although some scholars may doubt the wisdom of relying on official 
reports of the CCP, in my view, they provide a valuable record of events and their 
interpretation, and much can be learnt from reading between their lines. 
2 The Period Leading up to the Decision to Begin the Economic Reforms 
Three major events occurred in China in 1976. First, the moderate leader Premier 
Zhou Enlai died in January. He was more sympathetic to economic reforms than Mao 
Zedong and felt it important that China make progress with the ‘four modernizations’. 
He was greatly missed by the Chinese people who it is said spontaneously displayed 
their grief in Tiananmen Square (Li et al., 2007). Mao Zedong did not attend his 
funeral (Li et al., 2007), probably because of political disagreement with Zhou Enlai. 
In September 1977, Chairman Mao Zedong died. He had piloted China for around 27 
years following the foundation of the People’s Republic in 1949. He was a strong 
leader but during his period of leadership, the ‘Great Leap Forward’ and the ‘Cultural 
Revolution’ involved a heavy cost to China. Next, not long after Mao’s death, the 
Gang of Four were arrested. They were blamed for political ferment and adding to 
social unrest in Mao Zedong’s later years. 
With these changes, the stage now seemed to be set for China to follow a new 
development path. But there were no signs of this happening in 1977, despite 
continuing concerns in China about the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. 
After Mao Zedong’s death, Hua Guofeng became Chairman of the CCP and chaired 
its Eleventh Congress held in December 1977. Mao Zedong had nominated Hua 
Guofeng as he preferred successor. The documents of the Eleventh Congress reveal 
no fresh prescriptions for China’s development. Its documents support past policy 
approaches and attribute any past shortcomings in policy to the influence of capitalist 
deviationists in the CCP and those who failed to follow Mao Zedong thought, such as 
the Gang of Four. The emphasis of these documents is on the need for appropriate 
political action in being alert to deviationists in the CCP, eradicating these 
deviationists and guarding against external enemies of the CCP and China, including 
several foreign nations. In retrospect, the documents did not provide a positive and 
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constructive way forward for the CCP and China. They focused on political 
controversy and theory with little or no attention to economics and pragmatism. 
During 1977, Deng Xiaoping returned from the political wilderness to which he was 
assigned for a while before Chairman Mao died. Before Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping 
(like Zhou Enlai) believed that there was a need for economic and social reforms in 
China but his approach was rejected by the then leadership of the CCP. With his 
partial restoration to political power in 1977, Deng Xiaoping already displayed a 
positive new approach. He reformed the university entrance system. Entrance to 
university for students was now to be based on academic merit as indicated by 
examination results. The past histories of families of prospective students and their 
political connection were no longer to count. In the past, some students were barred 
from university entrance because members of their families had previously been 
landlords or capitalists (Li et al., 2007). 
Table 1 provides a chronology of events that have been associated with the 
formulation of China’s development policies in the last three decades or so. The 
implication of these events are outlined below. 
Table 1:  A Chronology of Events Affecting China’s Development Policies in 
the Last Three Decades or So 
Time Event 
Jan 1976 Premier Zhou Enlai dies. 
Sept 1977 Chairman Mao Zedong dies. Hua Guafeng becomes 
Chairman of the CCP and subsequently Deng Xiaoping 
returns from political exile. 
Dec 1978 Increasing CCP support for Deng Xiaoping’s reformist 
agenda culminates in its basic acceptance by the 11th 
Central Committee of the CCP. It was argued that the 
reforms should begin with agriculture. 
1979 Deng Xiaoping becomes Chairman of the Military 
Commission. He criticizes dogmatic approaches to policy 
and favours a pragmatic approach 
1980 Hua Guofeng steps down as Chairman of CCP. 
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Table 1 (cont.) 
 
Time Event 
Mid-1981 Under the influence of Deng Xiaoping, the CPC stresses 
that China’s policies for modernisation must be realistically 
based, systematic and staged, and take account of Chinese 
conditions. 
1984 The CCP decides that the economic reforms commenced in 
agriculture should be extended to the whole economy. An 
end to the privileged position of state enterprises is 
signalled. Increasing emphasis occurs on greater economic 
openness as an instrument of development policy. 
1989 Chairman Jiang Zemin confirms the direction of China’s 
development policies, such as extension of the market 
system and greater economic openness as well as measures 
to limit population growth. He saw the need for China to 
improve its science and technology policy because as China 
catches up with the rest of the world’s technology; it will 
need to do more to advance its own scientific and 
technological improvements. 
2002 Jiang Zemin in his report to the 16th Congress of the CCP 
re-affirms China’s policies for economic development but 
expressed concern about growing economic inequality in 
China. Given changed economic conditions in China, it 
seemed that Deng Xiaoping ‘s principle of payment 
according to work (expounded in 1978) was going to be 
modified 
2007 Chairman Hu Jintao in his report to the 17th Congress of the 
CCP then confirmed support for continuing earlier 
economic reforms but also indicated that policy must pay 
more attention to income inequality, approaching 
technological (and similar) barriers to China’s continuing 
development, and environmental and energy issues. 
2008 China faced the challenge of the global economic crises and 
formulated policies to weather the economic storm. This 
has been described as “China’s greatest [economic] crisis 
since its reforms 30 years ago”. 
Early 2009 Signs of recovery of economic activity in China as a result 
of Government intervention. China aims for 8% growth in 
GDP in 2009. 
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3 The Turning Point in 1978 and the Consolidation and Extension of the 
Economic and Social Reforms. 
3.1 Milestones in Deng’s development policies 
Already in 1977, Deng Xiaoping made it clear that performance should be the main 
consideration in the economic and social advancement of individuals. In other words, 
professionalism and results should count. Furthermore, he emphasised the importance 
of academics and scientists for the future of the economic development and the 
international standing of China. He thought that this should be more widely 
recognized by the Chinese people. During 1978, Deng Xiaoping’s reform philosophy 
gained growing support in the CCP and its desirability was accepted in December 
1978 at the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee. This session 
proved to be a turning point in the direction of China’s policies for its economic and 
social development. 
It was decided at this meeting that the system and methods of economic management 
in China would be transformed; economic co-operation with other countries would be 
expanded; special efforts would be made to adopt the world’s advanced technologies 
and equipment; and that scientific and educational work would be greatly 
strengthened to meet the needs of modernisation. The importance of the four 
modernizations (modernising agriculture, industry, national defence, science and 
technology) was emphasised. Furthermore, it was stated that “The general task put 
forward by our Party for the new period reflects the demands of history and the 
people’s aspirations and represents their fundamental interests” (The Research 
Department of Party Literature, 1991, pp. 9-10). The CCP now intended to 
concentrate on ‘rapid growth in production [to] improve the people’s living standards 
significantly and strengthen national defence” (The Research Department of Party 
Literature, 1991, p.10). 
Several other important decisions about reforms were made at the Third Plenary 
Session. There was recognition of the need to reduce bureaucratic centralised 
management of the economy and eliminate bureaucratic and political impediments to 
achieving economic efficiency and development, particularly at lower leves (such as 
local levels) of economic activity (The Research Department of Party Literature, 1991, 
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pp. 12-13). This was consistent with Deng Xiaoping’s emphasis on professionalism 
and efficient economic management. 
It was decided that the economic reforms should begin with agriculture because at that 
time it was “the foundation of the national economy”. Particular attention was given 
to the rule of law, decentralization and resource ownership in undertaking the 
agricultural reforms. These features were applied later to the rest of the economy. 
Again, in line with the views of Deng Xiaoping, it was agreed that economic 
incentives should be incorporated in the economic system and that economic 
responsibility should be stressed. The principle of “each according to his work” 
should be followed rather than the principle of “each according to his need”. It was 
stated that in order to promote production, it is necessary “to work out payment in 
accordance with the amount and quality of work done, and avoid equalitarianism”. 
This represented a major departure from China’s previous “iron bowl” policy which 
emphasised egalitarianism. 
The importance for China’s economic development and its future international 
standing and welfare of maintaining political stability under the continuing leadership 
of the CCP was stressed. The Third Plenary Session also praised Deng Xiaoping for 
his leadership in 1975 (The Research Department of Party Literature, 1991, p.15) and 
criticised those who were instrumental in his temporary fall from power (The 
Research Department of Party Literature, 1991, p.16). It rejected completely the view 
of his critics who claimed that Deng’s political line was “Right-deviationist wind to 
reverse correct verdicts” (The Research Department of Party Literature, 1991, p.16). 
Towards the end of 1980, the Political Bureau of the CPC’s Cultural Committee 
advised Hua Guofeng that he should step down as Chair of the CPC. Hua was accused 
of following “Left policies formulated by Comrade Mao Zedong in his later years” as 
evidenced, for instance, by his statement supporting the “two whatevers” (The 
Research Department of Party Literature, 1991, p.105). The “two whatevers” refers to 
a joint editorial of which Hua Guofeng was a joint author. It appeared in the People’s 
Daily on February 7, 1977 and elsewhere. The editorial stated “we will resolutely 
uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made, and unswervingly follow 
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whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave” (The Research Department of Party 
Literature, 1991, p.887). 
Possibly, Hua Guofeng had no other political option after he became leader following 
Mao’s death but to stress the continuity of policy in order to maintain social stability. 
This possibility was mentioned by the Cultural Committee in its non-confrontational 
advice to Hua (The Research Department of Party Literature, 1991). 
Deng Xiaoping was offered the Chair of the CPC but declined it and instead accepted 
the offer of Chairman of the Military Commission. Now it seemed that any remaining 
political impediments to the consolidation and extension of the economic reform 
policies advocated by Deng Xiaoping had been overcome. 
In March 1979, Deng Xiaoping gave a significant speech in which he stated: 
“Realizing the four modernizations is a many-sided complex and difficult 
undertaking. The task of the ideological and theoretical workers cannot be 
confined to discussion of the basic principles. We are confronted with many 
questions of economic theory, including both basic theory and theory applied 
to particular spheres such as industry, agriculture, commerce and 
management. Lenin called for more talk about economics and less about 
politics. In my opinion, his words are still applicable with regard to the 
proportion of effort that should be devoted to theoretical work in these two 
spheres. I am not saying of course that there are no more questions to be 
studied in the political field. For many years we have neglected the study of 
political science, law, sociology and world politics, and now we must hurry to 
make up our deficiencies in these subject. Most of our ideological and 
theoretical workers should dig into one or more specialized subjects. All 
those who can do so should learn foreign languages, so as to be able to read 
important foreign works on the social sciences without difficulty. We have 
admitted that we lag behind many countries in our study of the natural 
sciences. Now we should admit that we also lag behind in our study of the 
social sciences, insofar as they are comparable in China and abroad. Our level 
is very low and for years we haven’t even had adequate statistical data in the 
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social sciences, a lack that is naturally a great obstacle to any serious study” 
(Deng Xiaoping, 1979, p.188.) 
Consequently, Deng Xiaoping was of the opinion that much of the past ideological and 
political debate that had been occurring in China was arid and not conducive to 
tangible results. He made it quite clear that he wanted to change social concerns from 
politics to economics in order to provide China with positive economic benefits. 
In mid-1981, the CPC again stressed the importance of striving for the modernisation 
of China’s economy by acting systematically and in a staged fashion while basing its 
development policies on the realities of Chinese conditions and the level of available 
resources in China (The Research Department of Party Literature, 1991, p.196). Only 
modest and realistic goals would be sought. This contrasted with the much earlier 
attempt by China to make massive economic advances during China’s Great Leap 
Forward (Tisdell, 1996, p.228). Policies for the Great Leap Forward were mainly 
based on exhortation and did not take account of economic realities such as the 
importance within the domestic economy of regional and local economic 
specialization in accordance with the theory of comparative economic advantage. 
The issuing by the CCP of the document “On Reform of Economic Structures” in 
1984 marked an important milestone in the strengthening of China’s economic 
reforms and their extension. It was agreed that following the success of China’s rural 
economic reforms, similar reforms should be extended to the whole economy with the 
focus now being placed on the urban economy. By continuing and extending reforms, 
it was hoped to establish a dynamic economy, invigorate enterprises and establish an 
economic system in which economic activity and production would be responsive to 
economic values. 
Several important goals were outlined in the document “On Reform of Economic 
Structures”. It was stressed that a rational price system should be established for the 
whole economy and that this system should make use of economic incentives as 
levers. This would mean the extension of reliance on market systems for organising 
economic production – in essence, the development of market socialism with Chinese 
characteristics. 
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Enterprise functions were to be separated from those of the Government. This was to 
ensure that investment and production decisions by enterprises were made on 
economic grounds rather than political ones. Furthermore, it was confirmed that 
economic responsibility systems should be established for enterprises. This meant that 
the government no longer intended in the long-run to prop up uneconomic state 
enterprises with soft loans and other forms of financial support. Notice was also given 
that it would no longer be the case that state enterprises would have an unassailable 
position in the economy. A diversity of enterprise forms was to be encouraged. In 
addition, it was decided to press ahead with payment according to work as an 
economic incentive even though it was realized that this would result in greater 
income inequality. 
A continuing feature of China’s reforms would (according to this document dealing 
with economic reforms) be further promotion of economic openness through 
international economic cooperation, investment, trade and exchange. Great success 
was subsequently achieved in pursuing this goal, as for example, is shown in Tisdell 
(2009). 
In line with Deng Xiaoping’s emphasis on the relevance of professionalism, and the 
ability of individuals, it was also agreed that more emphasis should be put on 
promoting competent and talented persons in managerial and other positions. In 
addition, it was thought to be beneficial to strengthen party leadership in order to 
ensure the successes of the reforms. The unity of China under the CCP was seen as 
essential to securing a strong and reasonably prosperous future for China. 
The last part of the document “On Reform of Economic Structures” outlines a 
significant observation by Zhou Enlai. In the quotation from him, Zhou observes that 
the world is always changing and consequently, policies have often to be altered to fit 
these changing circumstances. Zhou Enlai concludes “therefore, man has constantly to 
sum up experiences and to go on discovering, inventing, creating and advancing” 
(The Research Department of Party Literature, 1991, p.426). In this regard, Zhou 
Enlai’s philosophy and that of Deng Xiaoping were similar. Deng was of the view that 
the world had changed and that the situation unfolding in the 1970s and beyond was 
different to that in the early days of the Republic. Hence, there was a need for the 
reforms that he advocated. He wanted to be guided more by economic pragmatism 
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and current realities than by old political theories based on a continuing class struggle 
and the inevitability of conflict between socialist countries and nations with 
economies based primarily on market capitalism. It is said that he was quite impressed 
with the industrial advances that Japan made after commencing its modernisation 
policies following the Meiji Restoration (Li et al., 2007). 
Deng Xiaoping’s influence on China’s development policies continued both directly 
an indirectly. In 1992, he toured the south of China giving speeches to assure Chinese 
and the rest of the world that China’s market reforms and open-door policies initiated 
by him would continue and even after his death, China kept basically on the 
development path that he had pioneered. 
3.2 The nature of Deng’s approach to policy change 
Deng Xiaoping is characterised by realism and gradualism, and the importance of 
learning by trial-and-error. Proposed new institutional structures were tried wherever 
possible only in a particular region or locality or sector of the economy at first. The 
economic and social results were then observed. If the policy proved to be a success, 
it was then extended more widely to other regions or sectors of the economy, 
modifying it if necessary in the light of the experience obtained. This was Deng’s 
method of ‘crossing the river by touching stones’. It is interesting to observe that this 
is the policy approach that China continues to use. In October 2008, the Central 
Committee of the CCP agreed to fundamental agricultural land reforms which in 
effect will (if they are fully implemented) result in agricultural land becoming private 
property (World Bank, 2008, p.19). However, implementation of this policy will be a 
gradual process. This reform will first of all be tried in one region and the experience 
gained there will become an input into the geographical widening of this policy for 
institutional changes. 
Roland (2000, pp.63-64) notes the significance of this type of approach to China’s 
development. In doing so, he is eager to show the relevance of the type of new 
economic institutionalism developed by Williamson (1975). Roland appears to claim 
that Deng’s gradualism demonstrates that China’s economic policies altered from 
ones involving a unitary form (U-form) of management to one based on a 
multidimensional form (M-form); from a centralised form of economic management 
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to a decentralised one. It is true that Deng Xiaoping’s reforms (as a whole) promoted 
this type of change. However, his strategy of crossing the river by touching stones 
does not necessarily imply decentralisation of management. In fact, it should be 
regarded as a very sensible application of the precautionary principle (Tisdell, 1970). 
3.3 How was Deng able to get the support of party leaders for his policies? 
An important question is how was Deng Xiaoping able to obtain support from the 
leadership of the CCP for his reform agenda? First, it was clear in 1978 that the earlier 
policies of the CCP were no longer able to deliver satisfactory economic results. This 
was partly because evolving economic systems had become increasingly complex. 
Secondly, Deng adopted political tactics that in the opinion of some observers helped 
to placate ‘hard-liners’ in the Party. He emphasised that his main objective was to 
preserve the dominance of the CCP in China, thereby securing the position of the 
Party’s leaders. In his view, a necessary condition for achieving this was to aim for 
maximum economic growth subject to the adoption of policies that would enable the 
party to keep its domination in China’s socioeconomic system. Qian and Wu (2008, 
p.56) summarise this objective to be one of maximizing economic growth subject to 
the constraint of Party maintaining control and they draw several significant 
conclusions from it. Deng thought it imperative that the Party should retain its control 
in China. Consequently, any Party member who supported policies sympathetic to 
political liberalism was not tolerated by Deng, even if they were staunch supporters 
of Deng’s economic reforms. For their apparent support of political liberalism, two 
secretary-generals of the CCP were dismissed (Hu Yaobang in 1987 and Zhao 
Zhiyang in 1989) even though both were strong supporters of Deng’s economic 
reforms (Qian and Wu, 2008, p.57). This unforgiving approach of Deng was 
welcomed by Party hard-liners.  
The fact that Deng’s reforms bore fruit relatively quickly would have also helped to 
placate traditionalists in the Party and might have helped to gain public support for it. 
Furthermore, Deng’s reforms were relatively gradual (and most definitely not of the 
‘big-bang’ type initially tried in Russia) which would have allayed the concerns of 
some of the Party conservatives. In addition, his reform policies were presented with 
socialist trappings and a nationalistic flair. For example, he described his ultimate 
goal as being to create ‘market socialism with Chinese characteristics’. Therefore, this 
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portrayed a socialistic and a nationalistic agenda. It would certainly not have been 
politically prudent of him to have described his programme as one designed to 
achieve capitalism with Chinese characteristics. Later, in this article, considerations 
will be given to what the achievement of ‘market socialism with Chinese 
characteristics’ might mean.  
 
4 Ongoing Reforms - Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao 
4.1 The basic political approach of Deng is retained but the need to modify 
policies becomes apparent 
Both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao continued advancing China’s economic reforms and 
adapting them to changing economic circumstances. Their core consideration 
continued to be the adoption of policies which would promote the rapid economic 
development of China. 
In 1989, Jiang Zemin stated that China’s continuing economic development would 
become more dependent on scientific and technological progress and on improved 
labour quality (The Research Department of Party Literature, 1991, p.305). In essence, 
this recognized that China’s economy was catching up with the rest of the world and 
that in higher income countries economic growth was highly dependent on scientific 
and technological progress and improvement in human capital, for example, via 
greater investments in education and in skilling (Denison, 1962).  
He also mentioned that population growth would continue to be controlled. This 
policy was introduced after the departure of Mao Zedong who favoured population 
growth and thus followed the line of Marx and Engels who rejected the theories of 
Robert Malthus completely. This policy has most likely helped China to raise its per 
capita income more quickly than otherwise. It can also be argued that it would have 
had environmental benefits. 
Nevertheless, by 1989, pollution and environmental problems had intensified in China 
as a result of its economic growth. Similar and arguably even worse, environmental 
problems were observed in capitalist countries during the Industrial Revolution. Jiang 
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Zemin mentioned that now increasing attention would be given to conservation of the 
ecological environment and to addressing environmental issues. This indicated that 
expanding the level of economic production would no longer be the sole arbiter of 
China’s development policy. In effect, the supremacy of the economic growth  goal 
(put forward in 1978) would be modified.  
In his report to the 16th Congress of the CCP in 2002, Jiang Zemin provided further 
guidance on policies for the continuing development of China (Jiang Zemin, 2002). 
He highlighted the importance of further raising living standards in China, of 
continuing improvement in the market system and the need for further expansion in 
overseas trade, foreign investment and international co-operation. However, he also 
expressed some concerns about growing income inequality in China and about 
disparities in access to social services. He suggested that some reforms would be 
needed in these areas. Therefore, some modification on equity grounds to the 
principle put forward by Deng in 1978 of payment according to the amount and 
quality of work done seemed to be called for due to China’s changed economic 
circumstances. It was becoming evident that some modification to the principle 
favoured in 1978 of payment according to work was needed on equity grounds. Some 
of the general issues raised by this principle are discussed in Tisdell (1993, Ch.6). 
Hu Jintao (2007), in reporting to the 17th Party Congress, outlined China’s remarkable 
achievements in the reform period. He confirmed continuing support for China’s 
reforms as a way of further strengthening China’s socialist market economy. He also 
mentioned several points which called for policy responses. These included: 
• Growing income inequality and unequal access to social services by individuals. 
• The fact that as a result of its economic development the Chinese economy had 
modernized greatly and was approaching some development frontiers. 
• The increased importance to China of energy and environmental issues. 
Jiang Zemin had noted these items earlier but they were given more emphasis by Hu 
Jintao. 
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The implications of the above are that review and reform of China’s income 
distribution system and its social services system are required; more attention should 
be paid to energy issues and the quality of the environment, and because of its 
catching up with the rest of the world, China’s future development will become 
increasingly dependent on its own science and technology capabilities and its use of 
more sophisticated science and technology as well as improvements in its human 
capital. The latter will, amongst other things, require improvements in its educational 
system and more effective methods for imparting skills to its people. China has 
already instituted major reforms to develop its science, technology and educational 
systems (see, for example, Geo and Tisdell, 2004). Furthermore, cultural development 
is likely to be given more attention in the future. These changes in emphasis reflect 
variations in China’s circumstances as the extent of its economic development has 
increased. 
A serious problem experienced by China in the second half of 2008 was the negative 
economic impacts on it of the global economic recession. This was a major threat to 
its economic stability with the potential to have adverse political consequences for the 
CCP. One writer described it as the greatest challenge facing China since its economic 
reforms commenced in 1979 (Pyo, 2009). Deng did not have to deal with an economic 
crisis of this magnitude during the time of his influence on  China’s economic policy. 
4.2 Observations on China’s development policies since 1989 
During the pre-2008 reform period, China was lucky that it could as a result of its 
market reforms and open-door policies tap into an expanding world market. Its 
opening up occurred during a period of sustained global growth and one involving 
economic globalization in which it was able to participate (Tisdell, 2009). To some 
extent, this was fortuitous. However, China would not have benefited from this 
situation without its reforms. It stole an economic march on India because India was 
much slower in reducing its barriers to international trade and investment (this was an 
advantage for China), and China was indirectly a beneficiary of the Washington 
consensus designed to support the global extension of market-based economic 
systems. 
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These international developments plus greater economic freedom within China 
resulted in rapid economic growth within China but they did not ensure its political 
stability. In 1989, this stability was tested by the Tiananmen demonstrations and 
surrounding events. Thus, it seemed that economic growth alone might not secure the 
dominant position of the CCP and demonstrated that some opportunistic party leaders, 
such as Zhao Ziyang, could wreck the one-party development strategy of the CCP. 
After 1989, China was fortunate from an economic development perspective that its 
political stability returned quickly as Deng reinforced and re-iterated (in the 
immediate years following 1989) his development policies. In that early period, Deng 
still remained an influential political and national leader. 
After 1989, China’s economy quickly reverted to its path of rapid growth and its 
market reforms and opening up continued. Deng’s approach of gradualism combined 
with learning-by-doing was retained. It was, for example, applied to the development 
of China’s environmental policies and it will be applied to the introduction of policies 
that could effectively privatize the ownership of agricultural land. However, not all 
policy formulation can be gradualistic or as gradual as one might like. For example, 
the fairly rapid (and to some extent unanticipated) onset of the current global 
recession has caused a severe economic shock to China’s economy, one requiring a 
relatively rapid political response. Consequently, Chairman Hu Jintao and Premier 
Wen Jia-bao have to address policy matters which Deng Xiaoping did not confront. 
They are also challenged by the growing complexity of the Chinese economy as it 
develops, the realization that economic development (and national development 
generally) involves more than growth in marketed goods and services (e.g. GDP), and 
by the need to keep in mind the changed position of China in the world order. While 
the political legacy of Deng Xiaoping is not irrelevant, it is becoming less useful for 
the formulation of specific policies. For example, it gives inadequate guidance about 
what should be done about income inequality and social welfare issues in China. 
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5 Indicators of China’s Economic Progress since 1978 and its Open-Door 
Policies 
5.1 Indicators of domestic economic progress 
In a short presentation, it is impossible to provide a comprehensive list of indicators of 
China’s economic progress since 1978 and to specify all the changes in its economic 
structure since its reforms began. Furthermore, its general achievements in this regard 
are relatively well known and have been outlined by several authors, including myself 
(Tisdell, 2009). Therefore, only the basics are outlined here. During its reform period, 
China amazed the rest of the world by its rapid rate of economic growth which in 
most years reached, or almost reached, double digit levels. As a result, China’s real 
GDP was over 13 times higher in 2006 than in 1978. This change is based on World 
Bank information which uses US prices for 2000 to estimate that China’s real GDP in 
1978 was US$157.7 billion whereas in 2006 it was US$2,100 billion. Furthermore, 
because of its controlled growth in population, the level of per capita income in China 
rose steeply. However, most economists realize that GDP alone and market-bases 
measures of per capita income can be a poor indicator of human welfare. Estimation 
of the Human Development Index (HDI) goes some way to addressing these concerns, 
even though it also has several limitations. Nevertheless, using the HDI measure, 
China progressed significantly in its reform period. According to UNDP estimates, in 
1975 China’s HDI was 0.530 and increased to 0.777 in 2005, that is by more than 
30%. Given a logarithmic scale is involved in the calculation of HDI, this is 
impressive. 
When the UNDP’s estimates of the HDI-values for China for the period 1975-2005 
are graphed (at five-year intervals) they show a continual upward trend that 
accelerates. Furthermore, between 1975 and 1980 estimates of the values of HDI 
show little changes. This ‘stagnation’ corresponds mainly to the immediate pre-reform 
period (see Tisdell, 2008, p.11) and it is followed by rapid growth in China’s HDI-
values. 
Another indicator of China’s economic success since starting its reforms is the 
substantial reduction it has achieved in its incidence of poverty which is now very low 
for a developing country (Tisdell, 2003). For example, Premier Wen Jia-bao stated in 
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a speech at the United Nations addressing the Millennium Development Goals, 
(MDGs) that “China has brought down the number of people in absolute poverty from 
250 million to 15 million in less than 30 years” (Wen, 2008). These figures for 
poverty are based on the Chinese national poverty standard. It is true that in 1978 the 
rural population in poverty was estimated officially by China to be 280 million 
(30.7% of the rural population) by 1998 it was down to 42 million (4.5%), 28 million 
in 2002 and by 2007 it had fallen to about 15 million (see Qian and Wu, 2008, p.42). 
Although the number of the rural dwellers in poverty is higher if the World Bank 
standard of poverty is used, there is still no denying that China has achieved an 
incredible reduction in the incidence of its rural poverty in the reform period; a 
reduction which would be the envy of countries like India. The initial Wold Bank 
estimates for rural population in poverty in China are for 1990, when it found 280 
million (31.3%) of the rural population to be in poverty. In 1998, the World Bank 
estimated that 106 million (11.5%) of the Chinese rural population were in poverty 
and this fell to 88 million in 2002, less than 10% of the rural population (see Qian and 
Wu, 2008, p.42). Therefore, China’s experience seems to accord with the ‘trickle-
down’ theory of economic growth. 
On the other hand, there has been a very significant increase in income inequality in 
China during the reform period. Inequality has risen within urban and rural areas and 
the disparity between average incomes in rural and urban areas has magnified. The 
relevant statistics are summarised by Qian and Wu (2008, p.43). 
5.2 Increased freedom 
A substantial benefit for ordinary people in China has been increased economic 
freedom. There has been increased scope for private investment, much greater 
freedom of geographical movement for work in China, a greater variety of choice in 
consumer goods and services (which is a type of freedom) and greater ability to travel 
both within China and abroad. There has also been progress in improving the rule of 
law in China, but political and civil liberties are still restricted (Qian and Wu, 2008, 
p.46-48), presumably as a measure to ensure the supremacy of the CCP and the 
stability of government. 
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The nature of the ownership enterprises in China’s economy has diversified greatly. 
The relative importance of state-owned enterprises has declined considerably (Yang 
and Zheng, 2005; Wen, 2005). Qian and Wu (2008, p.50) argue that more than 60% 
of China’s GDP is now produced by privately owned enterprise. During the reform 
period, China also became a magnet for foreign direct investment and many foreign 
enterprises now operate in China. Furthermore, China’s international trade openness 
has grown remarkably (Tisdell, 2006) and the structure of its trade has altered. It has 
increased its importance as an exporter of commodities that are more technologically 
sophisticated than in the past and the level of its own foreign direct investment has 
risen significantly. Nevertheless, the structure of its international trade still displays 
features of a country at a middle stage of development (Tisdell, 2007). 
Some other structural features associated with China’s reforms include massive levels 
of rural to urban migration (Cao, 2005) and there has been a large increase in the 
tertiary sector of the economy as a relative contributor to China’s employment and 
GDP, an expansion in its secondary sector and a decline in its primary industry in 
terms of relative employment. According to the theory of Colin Clark (1957), this is 
also a positive indicator of economic progress in China. Given underemployment in 
many rural areas of China in previous times, this structural change has been 
economically advantageous to China. However, once China’s agricultural labour 
surplus is fully employed, this may place upward pressure on wages in China in the 
future. Pyo (2009) mentions that already wages have begun to rise in China and this is 
causing some foreign investors to look elsewhere. Consequently, increased human 
productivity will increase in importance as a source of continuing economic growth as 
China’s agricultural labour surplus becomes increasingly absorbed. 
During its reform period, China has been the beneficiary of the type growth model 
described by Lewis (1965, Bauer, 1956) in which agricultural labour has been 
available in perfectly elastic (seemingly unlimited) supply to help provide the 
increasing labour force needed for greater industrialization. However, due to the 
phenomenal economic growth of China, the elasticity of this supply is beginning to 
diminish and it may diminish even further in the future. Rural labour migration has 
also become an issue in China because of the global economic downturn. In this 
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downturn, many rural to urban workers have lost their jobs with adverse economic 
consequences for them and their families. This issue will be considered later. 
5.3 Progress with China’s open-door policies 
According to data quoted by Qian and Wu (2006, p.40), China’s total foreign trade as 
a percentage of GDP in 1978 was 9.8% but this ratio increased constantly after 1978 
to reach 60.31% in 2003 and continued to rise. In 1988, the World Bank estimated 
that China’s gross exports were about 14% of its GDP (see Tisdell, 1993) and in 2008 
they amounted to about 40% of its GDP (World Bank, 2008, p.7). This means that 
China has had a large macroeconomic exposure to the recent global economic 
downturn. The World Bank (2008, p.7) comments that “….exports are more important 
in China than in other large emerging market economies, even [if] China is more 
robust than most to external stocks, because of its strong macroeconomic 
fundamentals and large balance of payment surpluses”. On the other hand, much of 
China’s exports are based on processing of imported components, as pointed out and 
modelled by Tisdell (2007) and as recently confirmed by empirical work of the World 
Bank which estimates that China’s share of its exports to its GDP in value added 
terms is around 17.5% (World Bank, 2008, p.7). 
A very important contribution to China’s open-door development has been the inflow 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) to China. China became the major global recipient 
of FDI during its reform period. Prior to 1979, FDI in China was negligible but after 
1979 it rose rapidly with a small temporary decline in the late 1990s, probably 
associated with the Asian Financial Crisis. With the passage of time, China’s FDI 
inflow has become less important as a proportion of China’s GDP. It peaked as a 
proportion of China’s GDP in 1993 but the absolute amount of FDI in China 
continued to rise (see Tisdell, 2009, pp.222-223 for details). The inflow of FDI to 
China had many advantages for it: it brought with it new systems of business 
management, helped transfer modern technologies to China and provided China with 
valuable foreign exchange and increased its access to foreign markets. The process of 
opening up was also a gradual one which began first with the establishment of special 
trade zones. 
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Another important part of China’s opening up has been the expansion of its own 
direct investment abroad (Tisdell, 1993, Ch.4). This is a strategy to extend China’s 
market reach, help transfer new technologies from abroad and to secure access to its 
import of raw materials. The latter can also expected to be an influence on China’s 
foreign policy. China is, for example, a major importer of oil and its oil exports will 
rise. 
 
6 Perspectives on Market Socialism with Chinese Characteristics 
6.1 Political emphasis on the development of socialism with Chinese 
characteristics 
Deng Xiaoping (1984) first proposed that China should build market socialism with 
Chinese characteristics and subsequent Chinese leaders have emphasised the 
importance of doing this. Nevertheless, it does not seem to be possible to find an exact 
(or even a relatively precise) official definition of the term. However, it is clear that 
Deng Xiaoping was of the opinion that China in its transition to a mixed economy 
should take account of economic realities in China, its cultural background and be 
pragmatic in seeking China’s stable economic development. Also he had in mind that 
during China’s economic transition, its prior institutional structures would have to be 
taken into account in planning and executing its reforms. In other words, he was well 
aware of the phenomenon of path-dependence. In addition, he emphasised that it is 
imperative to maintain the central role of the Communist Party in China. 
6.2 Comparison with market socialism as envisaged by Lange 
The question naturally arises of how does market socialism with Chinese 
characteristics differ from market socialism as envisaged by Taylor (1938) and Lange 
(1938) and as also considered by Barone (1935). Their type of socialism envisaged 
that a socialist government would play a guiding role in adjusting market-determined 
prices to facilitate movement to market equilibria. A relevant government body would 
be established to act as a pilot to guide market prices by trial-and-error towards their 
equilibria in markets (Tisdell, 1972, Ch.22). But such a mechanism is not used in the 
People’s Republic of China. To a large extent, prices of commodities in China are 
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allowed to seek their own levels within markets. Nevertheless, not every market is 
entirely free of government intervention. Therefore, the market guidance mechanism 
for equilibrating markets proposed in Lange’s form of market socialism has not been 
adopted in China.  
Lange (1938) also envisaged that the government in his socialist market economy 
would have a major influence on the level of aggregate investment and that 
investment would be allocated by an investment board. Lange’s model assumed the 
state ownership of the means of production. Such ownership is becoming less and less 
important in China. Nevertheless, the Chinese Government has a major influence both 
on the amount and nature of investment in China, particularly in infrastructure and in 
the selection of key sectors for development, as well as in human capital formation 
and in the direction of scientific and technological research. It could therefore be 
argued that this aspect of Lange’s socialist model has, to some extent, been adopted. 
The Chinese economy has become a mixed economy in which the CCP plays a central 
role by providing a general framework or blueprint for China’s development. 
Nevertheless, whereas Lange’s model assumed state ownership of all capital, this 
pattern is no longer followed in China. We can conclude that the Chinese model does 
not conform with Lange’s model of competitive market socialism. 
6.3 The analysis of Qian and Wu of development of market socialism with Chinese 
characteristics 
Given the economic transformation that has occurred in China, the question could be 
asked of whether China’s economy displays socialism with Chinese characteristics or 
would be more appropriately described as involving capitalism with Chinese 
characteristics. Could it be that Deng Xiaoping was really aiming for capitalism with 
Chinese characteristics but for political reasons, found it unwise to state this? Or is it 
possible that he did not know exactly how the economic reforms would evolve? To 
some extent, this is irrelevant. The reality is that China has a mixed economy today in 
which the CCP has a major overall guiding role with detailed economic decisions 
being to a large extent decentralised.  
Qian and Wu (2008) undertake a reductionist analysis of the terms in ‘market 
socialism with Chinese characteristics’ and conclude that it has not yet been achieved 
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in China. They find that markets have developed but that the process of this 
development is far from complete. They also argue that (at this stage) China does not 
display attributes associated with socialism of some types. According to their 
estimates, more than 60% of China’s GDP is supplied by private enterprise and 
private ownership of resources is rising. Therefore the means of production are not 
significantly owned by the state. Secondly, China is not yet a welfare state; another 
possible attribute of socialism. Income inequality has increased markedly and income 
support and redistribution policies have been inadequate to moderate this inequality. 
According to Qian and Wu (2008, p.52) a favourite slogan of Deng Xiaoping was that 
economic development should proceed by ‘letting some people get rich first, and 
gradually all the people should get rich together”. Just how gradual that process 
should be and how it will happen is unspecified. Therefore, Qian and Wu (2008) 
conclude that market socialism has not yet been achieved in China. 
As for ‘Chinese characteristics’, they argue that China has many characteristics that 
make it unique and agree that this is an important factor influencing the development 
policies of the CCP. They conclude that what matters most for the development of 
China is the leadership of the Communist Party given its dominating role. They point 
out that “the Chinese Communist Party is no longer a Communist Party committed to 
public ownership. It is also gradually moving away from being a totalitarian party in 
the sense of controlling everything and everybody”. (Qian and Wu, 2008, p.53). 
In September, 2008, I asked a leading Chinese scholar what ‘market socialism with 
Chinese characteristics’ means. His reply was that it means whatever the CCP wants it 
to mean. This view stresses the overarching significance of the role of CCP leaders in 
guiding China’s development. 
6.4 China as a ‘developmental state’ and increasing complexity of its management 
In order to better understand the pattern of China’s economic development, some 
scholars have categorized it as a ‘developmental state’ (Bolesta, 2007; Woo-Cumings, 
1999). In that regard Bolesta (2007, p.105) argues that China has adopted a similar 
development approach to that followed by Japan during the Meiji era and by 
Bismarck in relation to German development. Bolesta (2007, p.105) states: “The 
governments of these states followed a state designed development path and until now 
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have been favouring state interventionism over a liberal open market …” Furthermore, 
he also states (p.105): “The development state is often conceptually positioned 
between a liberal open economy and a central-planned model”. It is neither capitalist 
nor socialist. The government takes an active role in guiding development in co-
operation with business interests. He also mentions in his article that the success of 
such a state is heavily dependent on the professional ability of its public servants.  
As mentioned earlier in my article, Deng was quite impressed with the Japanese 
development model. Furthermore, in the past, China has had a strong system of public 
administration based on the selection of officials on the basis of scholarly merit. There 
are indications (see section 3.1) that Deng was trying to re-develop such a system, but 
one attuned to modern needs. In my view, China is still striving to recreate a 
meritocracy system of this nature. 
From the above discussion, it seems clear that the continuing success of China’s 
economic development and its sustainability of China as a nation depend integrally on 
the quality of the leadership shown by the CCP. This was emphasised by Gérard 
Roland in a presentation made by him at the Renmin University of China on 20th 
September, 2008 at a conference to mark 30 years of economic reform in China. 
Professor Roland of the University of California (Berkeley) argued that given the new 
institutionalist perspective on factors favourable to economic development, as for 
example outlined by North and Thomas (1976) and North (1990), China should not 
have had the spectacular economic growth which it has experienced in the last 30 
years. For example, North and Thomas (1976) attributed rapid economic growth in 
Britain in the Industrial Revolution to the reduction of state control over civil activity 
and the restriction of the power of the state to interfere in economic decision-making.  
It is, however, true that in the reform period China has increased private property 
rights and extended the operation of markets, factors which gives the theories of 
North should be favourable to economic growth. At the same time, it can be argued 
that the power and status of the state has not withered in China, a factor which 
according to North would not be favourable to economic development. 
It could be argued that North’s theories have been too much influenced by the 
development experiences of the UK and the United States. Gerschenkron (1962, Ch.1) 
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has argued that countries that industrialised and developed later, such as Germany, 
had a different pattern of development and that dissimilar pathways to economic 
development of nations may be required at different times in history and in unlike 
cultural contexts. Roland (2008) supports the idea that institutional transplantation 
from one society to another to achieve economic development is likely to result in 
failure. He doubts whether direct transplantation of Western-style institutions to China 
would have been effective in ensuring its recent economic growth. He comments: 
“Based on its existing stock of cultural knowledge (which differs strongly from that in 
the West) China, like other Asian countries, has developed unique fast-moving 
institutions in achieving its recent growth trajectory. Thus, China is experimenting 
with its own institutions for the market economy instead of importing Western 
institutions (Roland, 2008, p.148). 
Although the CCP has significantly reduced its interference with microeconomic 
decision-making since beginning its reforms of China’s economy, major patterns of 
China’s economic development are still subject to central direction, either directly or 
indirectly, in accordance with the policies of the CCP. This approach appears to be the 
kernel of market socialism with Chinese characteristics.  
The implication of the above discussion is that the rapid economic growth of the 
Chinese economy in the last 30 years is due to positive leadership of the CCP, and 
that continuing improvements in the welfare of the Chinese people depend on the 
quality of that leadership being sustained. Thus, an issue of continuing importance is 
how the quality of this leadership can be maintained and improved. Furthermore, as 
China’s economic development proceeds, the direction of its economic development 
will become more complex. When China began its reform in 1978, its overriding aim 
was to promote economic growth. This seemed appropriate at the time given the low 
level of per capita income in China. However, as economic growth has proceeded and 
per capita incomes have risen, other goals such as those involving the environment 
and income distribution have increased in significance. Thus, multiple economic goals 
are of growing importance. It is much more complicated to set performance goals for 
achieving multiple goals and the measurement of performance is much more difficult 
than in the case of pursuing a single goal, such as one of accelerating economic 
growth. Therefore, it is possible that the CCP maybe tardy in providing economic 
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incentives for the pursuit of multiple goals. In any case, pursuing multiple 
development goals is very challenging from an administrative point of view.  
7 The Reform Process in Retrospect 
Without its economic and related reforms, it seems likely that China would have been 
stuck in a political and economic rut after 1977. Its reforms proceeded systematically 
and gradually as planned and were based on realistic goals. Nevertheless, although a 
‘big bang’ approach was avoided, the reform process was carried out resolutely. In 
retrospect, the restructuring of China’s economy was achieved in a relatively short 
period of time. China’s reforms proceeded step-by-step beginning in the rural areas, 
extending later to urban areas to encompass eventually the whole economy. They 
have been marked by pragmatism, a willingness to experiment regionally and to learn 
from experience. 
As pointed out, the reform process and features of the economy requiring attention 
have altered as new stages have been reached in China’s economic development but 
the basic goal remains the same as in 1978. The CCP is keeping to its basic goal of 
improving the well-being of the Chinese people but its policies are being adjusted to 
allow for changing circumstances. This is consistent with the pragmatic philosophy 
expressed by Zhou Enlai and by Deng Xiaoping. 
China’s reforms have not only benefited the Chinese people but have brought 
substantial economic and global benefits. They have stimulated global economic 
growth and have contributed to global economic and political stability. China has 
developed into a new global economic centre, making countries such as Australia less 
dependent on traditional overseas markets for their international trade. China’s 
contribution to diversifying the location of regional and global economic activity 
appears to have provided a stabilizing force for reducing global and regional 
fluctuations in economic activity. Although China has become very dependent on 
international trade and exchange as a contributor to the level of its economic activity, 
its economic development during the reform period has expanded its domestic market 
greatly. While China is not immune to the consequences of global economic recession, 
further expansion in China’s home market will help to mitigate the impact on it of 
global economic recession. This should help to maintain regional economic stability. 
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China will also be assisted in stabilizing its economy by the high level of its 
international monetary reserves. It might be noted that China played an important 
stabilizing role in containing the Asian Financial Crisis which occurred a few years 
ago. However, the current global economic crisis poses a greater policy challenge for 
China. 
 
8 The Challenge of the Global Recession 
8.1 China’s ability to cope with the recession 
Coping with the global recession is a major (but not insuperable) challenge for 
China’s policy-makers even though some writers have described it as China’s greatest 
economic challenge since it began its reforms (Pyo, 2009). Reasons why China is well 
placed to weather the global recession include:  
• Its very high level of foreign exchange reserves (World Bank, 2008). 
• The fact that FDI in China is not as important as a proportion of GDP as it used 
to be and therefore, China’s level of economic activity is less dependent on it 
(Tisdell, 2008). 
• The Chinese Government has taken prompt and decisive action to counteract 
the negative effects on its domestic economic activity of economic recession 
abroad (Wen Jia-bao, 2009). 
• The actual dependence of China on exports for the level of its economic 
activity is much less than the gross value of its exports in relation to its GDP 
indicates; this dependence is more than halved when account is taken of 
imported components that are re-exported in goods manufactured in China 
(World Bank, 2008, p.13; Tisdell, 2007). 
• There is significant scope to expand domestic demand to replace the decline in 
foreign demand for China’s products. 
The above does not, however, mean that it is easy for China to adjust to the global 
economic crisis. It faces some difficult adjustment problems. 
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8.2 Problems facing China in coping with the global recession 
Now that China’s economy is increasingly market-driven and more open, it is at 
greater risk from macroeconomic fluctuations than in the past. The Chinese 
Government has had its control over such fluctuations and their impacts on 
unemployment reduced. In general, economic globalisation has reduced the degree of 
control of national governments of macroeconomic activity within their own countries 
(Tisdell and Sen, 2004) This is also the case for China. The increasing market 
orientation and economic openness of China’s economy has two sides to it: it has 
stimulated China’s economic growth but at the same time has reduced security of 
employment within China, particularly involuntary unemployment as defined by 
Keynes (1936). There are, according to Pyo (2009, p.45) fears in China that increasing 
unemployment in China due to the global recession could trigger social and political 
unrest, and therefore, the Chinese Government has acted swiftly. 
Unemployment of urban residents has been rising since the recession began and 
increased unemployment of rural-to-urban workers who have lost their jobs is of 
particular concern. There are around 220 million of these workers (described as Nong 
Min Gong) and their remittances contribute significantly to the incomes of farmers 
and other rural dwellers. It is estimated that almost 20% of these workers have lost 
their jobs and returned home (Pyo, 2009, p.46). This exodus is expected to further 
widen the gap between the levels of urban and rural incomes. 
China is trying to address this problem with a multi-pronged stimulus package 
described briefly below. It is not only accelerating its infrastructure investment, 
moving ahead more quickly with the provision of safety nets and social services, it is 
also providing economic support to selected industries, and has adopted measures to 
stimulate purchasing by domestic consumers. It is important for China not to lose 
industries now which currently experience economic problems but which would be 
economically viable once the global recession has passed. The demise of such 
industries in the current economic crisis could lead to permanent loss of expertise in 
these industries. Furthermore, in some cases, domestic increased demand for their 
products cannot easily be substituted for reduced foreign demand; and capital and 
human resources once assigned to a particular purpose are not easily switched to other 
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purposes in modern economies because there is a high degree of specificity in the 
short-to medium-term in resource use. 
8.3 Ways in which China is meeting the challenge of the recession 
It is not possible here to go into the details of China’s stimulus package and the 
prospects of China achieving its 8% growth rate this year. However, it does appear 
that China’s stimulus policies are working and that it is using this crisis as an 
opportunity to advance its long-term development plans. The World Bank (2008, p.1) 
gives the following comment: 
“The stimulus policies provide China with a good opportunity to rebalance 
its economy in line with the objectives of the 11th five-year plan. The 
stimulus package contains many elements that support China’s overall 
long term development and improve people’s living standards. Some of 
the stimulus measures give some support to the rebalancing of the pattern 
of growth from investment, exports, and industry to consumption and 
services. The government can use the opportunity of the fiscal stimulus 
package to take more rebalancing measures, including on energy and 
resource pricing; health, education and the social safety net; financial 
sector reform; and institutional reforms.” (World Bank, 2008, p.1). 
China’s stimulus measures are not focused just on the support of industries (they are 
multi-pronged) but Pyo (2009, p.49) pays particular attention to China’s industrial 
policy measures and states that:  
“The Chinese government has recently selected the fabric, steel, metal, car 
manufacturing, petrochemical, shipping, electronics, communications, and 
light industries as the beneficiaries of its extensive stimulus package. It 
plans to provide support in various forms, such as export and value added 
tax reduction; support for expansion into overseas markets; and expansion 
of government purchases. The nine industries selected are labor intensive, 
so from the implementation of this policy, the Chinese government is 
expecting both economic growth and lower unemployment.” 
30 
To the extent that China supports these industries, it may benefit but this policy could 
add to the economic difficulties facing its international competitors in the same 
industries. To some extent, these policies may be seen as beggar-my-neighbour 
policies. On the other hand, if they support economic growth and social stability in 
China, this could have positive flow-on effects in contributing to global economic 
recovery from its current recession. 
Depending on how long and severe the global economic recession proves to be, it 
could bring changes in China’s development policy. For example, China may switch 
to greater reliance on its domestic market for economic growth than in the past and 
reduce its comparative reliance on foreign markets. In any case, this could be a natural 
part of China’s progress with its economic development. This does not, however, 
imply that China will become inward-looking in its economic and international affairs. 
 
9 Concluding Comments 
Change is inevitable, as Zhou Enlai pointed out and as Deng Xiaoping observed. The 
circumstances which China will face in the next 30 years will differ from those of the 
last 30 years. Even during the last 30 years, conditions have altered as China has made 
substantial headway with its economic development. This has required variations in 
policy decisions even though the basic goals of Chinese policy remain unaltered. 
China is adjusting and will continue to adjust its balance between equity in income 
distribution and access to social services, its environmental conservation goals and 
cultural development in relation to the continuing growth of its material wealth. While 
China will continue to seek ongoing economic growth, greater emphasis is likely to be 
placed on other factors that affect human welfare than was the case in 1978. This is 
appropriate in view of changing circumstances. In my view, China’s importance for 
global and regional stability and development will continue to magnify. Furthermore, 
its international economic, political and cultural influence can be expected to grow. 
Changes in China’s economic and social structure are likely as it approaches the 
frontier of economic development and as it becomes comparatively modernized. This 
has already been evidenced in major changes in institutional arrangement for 
delivering scientific and technological results (Gao and Tisdell, 2004) and continuing 
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reform is occurring in China’s higher education system. Nevertheless, China’s 
changing economic position and enhanced global status will bring new challenges for 
China. It will be more difficult for China to keep a low profile in and avoid the 
spotlight in international affairs. Furthermore, the Chinese economy is more 
dependent on the use of international resources and is becoming a major user of these 
resources. Access to these resources may generate international rivalry and China is 
likely to come under greater global scrutiny for its use of the natural environment, for 
example, the level of its greenhouse gas emissions. 
In addition, there are high international hopes that China will continue to be an engine 
contributing to global economic growth for some time to come and signs of economic 
recovery in China have strengthened global economic confidence in recovery from the 
current economic recession. 
In 30 years, China’s reforms have not only resulted in it achieving a phenomenal 
increase in its living standards, it has made China a major global economic actor and 
has enhanced its status in the world community. Just how its system is likely to 
develop is difficult to predict but China is unlikely to revert to its doctrinaire position 
held prior to 1978. It is possible that China will not develop a multi-party democratic 
system of the type common in Western democracies in the foreseeable future, even if 
it continues to extend its market system. This is because, as indicated by Roland 
(2008), there is a significant difference between Chinese and Western characteristics 
which are more fully appreciated when an institutional approach to economics is 
adopted. China’s economic development cannot be understood without taking into 
account its historical, political and cultural background.  
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